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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TED R. BROWN AND ASSOCIATES
INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant

Case No. 15928

vs.
CARNES CORPORATION, a corporation, and LONG DEMING
UTAH, INC., a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TED R. BROWN AND ASSOCIATES
INC. I
Plaintiff-Appellant

Case No. 15928

vs.
CARNES CORPORATION, a corporation, and LONG DEMING
UTAH, INC., a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc., brought an action
for the collection of a sales commission against Carnes Company 1 and Long Deming utah, Inc.

An appeal was brought to

review two decisions of the district court in which two
different judges ruled that Carnes Company is not subject to
the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts.
Carnes Company is an unincorporated division of Wehr
Corporation, a foreign corporation not qualified to do business
in the State of Utah.

Carnes Company has appeared specially

lcarnes Corporation later became an unincorporated division
of byWehr
Corporation,
it is
now
known
Carnes
Sponsored
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Fundingand
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Services
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throughout all of the proceedings in this action, without
entering a general appearance, and it does not enter a general
appearance now.
DISPOSITION IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Court reversed the decisions of the district court
in an opinion filed April 2 4, 1980.

It held Carnes Company had

sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Utah to justify
application of the long-arm statute (§§78-27-22-et seq. Utah
Code Ann. (1953)) and thereby subject it to the jurisdiction of
the Utah Courts.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Carnes Company respectfully petitions this Court fora
rehearing of its decision and, then, an affirmance of the district court's orders.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A detailed statement of the substantive facts and
procedural history of this case was set forth in Carnes Company's initial responsive brief. 2 It is not necessary to
repeat it here.

Any additional factual information necessary

to the consideration of this matter will be set forth in the
argument.

2see Brief of Respondent, at 2-10.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT CARNES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURTS UNDER
THE LONG-ARM STATUTE.

Brown insists Carnes has actively transacted business
in Utah within the meaning of the Utah long-arm statute and is,
therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts.
This Court accepted that argument.

Carnes urges the Court to

reconsider because the causes of action alleged by Brown do not
arise from the Utah activities of Carnes.
Carnes has never conducted business in Utah to the
extent that general jurisdiction can be obtained. So, jurisdiction over Carnes, as a non-resident defendant, is controlled
by the Utah long-arm statute (§§78-27-22-et seq. Utah Code Ann.
(1953)).
§78-27-24.

In its opinion, the Court relied on two paragraphs of
That section provides in pertinant part:
Any person, notwithstanding section
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this state, who in person
or through an agent does any of the
following enumerated acts, submits
himself, and if an individual, his
personal representative, to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this
state as to any claim arising from:
(1) The transaction of any business
within the state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or
goods in this state;

*

*

*
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Neither provision supports jurisdiction.
observe that §78-27-26 Utah Code Ann.

It is critical to

(1953) 3 permits only

those claims arising from acts specifically enumerated in
§78-27-24 to be asserted against a defendant over whom jurisdiction is based on the long-arm statute.

Brown's claims did

not arise from Carnes' contractual agreement to supply equipment to third parties in the State of Utah nor did they arise
from the transaction of business in this State.

There have

been no claims covering that equipment, either the manner in
which it was supplied or its quality.
arose, as stated in the complaint,

4

This cause of action

soley from an alleged

breach and wrongful termination of Brown's sales representative agreement with Carnes.

3 Section 78-27-26 Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides:
"Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein may be
asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdictior
over him is based upon this act."
4 Brown's complaint set forth three counts:
(1) that the
plaintiff's relations hip as sales represen ta ti ve was terminate:
after the plaintiff had obtained a tentative order for Carnes'
equipment to be installed in the proposed office building of
the L.D.S. Church, and before the construction contracts for
the building were awarded; therefore, plaintiff was entitled t:
the commission on the equipment eventually ordered, notwithstanding the subsequent sales agreement between the defendants
and the provisions of plaintiff's contract; (2) that if not
entitled to the full commission, plaintiff was entitled to a
portion of it; and (3) that the defendants had conspired to
terminate the plaintiff's agreement with Carnes; therefore,
plaintiff was entitled not only to the commission lost on the
office building but to other unspecified lost commissions and
punitive damages as well. (R. 160-163).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-4-by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Carnes concedes that an action by its purchaser to
whom it contracted to supply goods and services would lie in
this state but that is not the basis of Brown's claims.

They

are based on Carnes' termination of a contract, presumably in
Wisconsin.

Such being the case, although Carnes' activities

would support jurisdiction for some other action under
§78-27-26, no jurisdiction arises for Brown because of
§78-27-26.

"Contacts" jurisdiction gives jurisdiction only for

suits involving those contacts.

See Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc.

v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978).

Identical

reasoning reaches an identical result under §78-27-24(1):
Carnes transacted sufficient business in Utah to give jurisdiction in actions based on those Utah activities, i.e., as to
its buyers, but not as to unrelated causes of action such as
those alleged by Brown.

As in the other elements of the

long-arm statute, the contacts which establish jurisdiction
must also establish plaintiff's claims. 5

5carnes is a Wisconsin corporation not qualified to do
business in Utah. Clearly Carnes does not have sufficient
activities in Utah to support a claim of general jurisdiction.
There would be an obvious constitutional objection, for
example, to a suit brought in Utah by a Utah corporation whose
subsidiary in California purchased goods from Carnes.for
California delivery, or a suit brought by a Utah resldent.for
personal injury resulting from acts of Carnes' agent outs1de of
Utah.
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The recent decision of Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco,
Inc.,

P.2d

(Utah, No. 15987, filed April 11, 1980),

is important since it sets forth the standard to be applied
here.

Plaintiff, a local firm, alleged it made an oral

agreement with defendant, a Kentucky fabricating company.

T~

agreement would have allowed the Utah company to earn a
"finder's fee" for services in connection with the sale of
goods in Utah.

However, according to plaintiff, the finder's

fee was never paid and so it filed a lawsuit.

Defendant

responded to the suit by alleging the court did not have
jurisdiction in the case because the company had no purposeful
contacts in the state and never really conducted business
here.

The trial court ruled jurisdiction existed.
The Supreme Court reversed.

di C:

!10t

It held that the

reco~

show the defendant was doing business in Utah to such

an extent that the courts would have general jurisdiction.
Consequently, the plaintiff was required to show that its cau:
of action arose out of one or more of defendant's contacts wi~
the state as set forth in §78-27-24.

As the Court observed,

the plaintiff could not meet the evidentiary requirement:
Plaintiff argues that the "minimal contact" test of
International Shoe is satisfied, as defendant transacted.
business in this State, contracted to supply goods in th 1'
State, and defendant's employees were physically present
this State.
But we are not here concerned with defendant's
contract for the sale of goods to U.S. Steel Credit
Corporation, nor with the installation of the equipment'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the Utah American Steel plant, and plaintiff's claim does
not arise ?ut of those activities. Plaintiff's alleged
contract w1th defendant 1s collateral to its''activities
re~ating to the sale of equipment to U.S. Steel Corporatlon, and such a contract between plaintiff and defendant
would portray plaintiff's, and not defendant's, services '
and activities within this State.

*

*

*

Here, defendant's purposeful activities within this
State consisted of its sale of equipment ultimately
destined for installation in this State, and its entry into
this State for the purpose of overseeing the installation
of that equipment. These contacts would be sufficient for
the establishment of limited jurisdiction if this litigation concerned an action for breach of warranty or
negligence in installing the equipment, brought by Utah
American Steel or U.S. Steel Credit Corporation, but this
plaintiff cannot avail himself of such contacts for the
purpose of his claim or an enitrely different contract. To
do so he must show that this State has general jurisdiction; to wit, the defendant has conducted substantial and
continuous business in this State. Plaintiff has shown no
purposeful activity on the part of defendant within this
State by which it could be said that defendant knew or
should have known that is was subjecting itself to the
jurisdiction of our Courts, for the purposes of this alleged contract for commissions.
P.2d at
(Footnote omitted.)
II.

THE COURT DID NOT ADDRESS JUDGE
LEARY'S REFUSAL, AS A MATTER OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, TO PERMIT
RELITIGATION OF THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION.

It is evident the Court did not address the jurisdictional issue on the basis of the evidence before Judge Hall
in 1974.

Judge Leary, in addition to considering the issue on

the merits, took into account that there were no changes in
circumstances or other factors which as a matter of judicial
administration should permit Brown to litigate the jurisdictional issue twice.

This question of fairness and judicial

administration
is different from the principle of res judicata
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referred to in Justice Crockett's concurring opinion.

In

fairness to the trial court, the question should be addressed
by this Court.
its Brief.

Carnes discussed the question on the merits in

6

III.

THE COURT FAILED TO DETERMINE
THE ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE
FINAL DECISIONS AND ARE APPEALABLE.

Finally, Carnes is obligated to note to the Court, as
it did in its brief,

7

that the two orders appealed by Brown

were not final decisions and, consequently, they were not
iTIDedia~ly

app~lable

to this Court.

Rule 54 (b) of the Utah

1

Rules of Civil Procedure governs the entry of a judgment in
actions such as this one with multiple parties.

It is

readi~

apparent from a review of the record that Brown did not
with the requirements of the Rule.

comp~

The orders are, therefore,

not now appealable.
Recently, the Court has dismissed other appeals

whe~

the judgment to be reviewed was not final and the parties had
not met the requirements of Rule 54(b).

See, e.g., South

Shores Concession, Inc. v. Utah, 600 P.2d 550 (Utah 1979); ~
Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979); Kenned~
New Era Industries, Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979).

6

Here,

See Brief of Respondent, at 15-18.

7see Brief of Respondent, at 11-15.
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however, the Court's decision did not address the issue.
Carnes urges the Court to do so and, on that basis, dismiss the
appeal.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Carnes Company respectfully
petitions this Court for a rehearing of its decision and, then,
an affirmance of the district court's orders.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of May, 1980.

~i

of the firm of
MOYLE & DRAPER
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Carnes Corp.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing and Brief in
Support of Petition for Rehearing to the following this 27th
day of May, 1980, postage prepaid:
Allen H. Tibbals, Esq.
Craig G. Adamson, Esq.
TIBBALS & STATEN
220 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
Robert D. Merrill, Esq.
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant Long
Deming Utah, Inc.
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